Michigan Law Review
Volume 46

Issue 6

1948

BILLS AND NOTES-IMPOSTERS IN THE LAW OF BILLS AND
NOTES
Ralph W. Aigler
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Contracts Commons

Recommended Citation
Ralph W. Aigler, BILLS AND NOTES-IMPOSTERS IN THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES, 46 MICH. L. REV. 787
(1948).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol46/iss6/4

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

COMMENTS
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BILLS AND NoTEs-lMPOSTERS IN THE LAW OF BILLS AND NoTES

-Two crooks, Baron and Brasch, now apparently residents of the
New Jersey penitentiary, yielded to the temptation to acquire money
by supposedly easy means. They selected as their victim a Miss Russell,
a retired school teacher with more cash than is usual in the cases of
people with her background. She seems to have had a strong leaning
towards charitable contributions, and it was this trait which commended
her to Baron and Brasch.
'
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Their plan for separating her from her fortune was not particularly complex, but out of it developed a most interesting lawsuit.1 The
perpetration of the frauds started with telephone requests by Baron
that Russell contribute to designated charities. Such requests fell into
two classes. In the first Baron impersonated one Geller, a responsible
resident of Paterson known to Russell only by reputation. Upon
Russell's assent to a request, Baron would tell her that since he, as
Geller, did not want his name to appear, she should make her check
payable to the order of his secretary, Williams by name. In truth'
there was no Williams, but Brasch, calling himself Williams, would
then call on Miss Russell and receive her check. Checks thus acquired
were turned over to' Baron who indorsed them, in the presence of
Brasch, in the name of the designated payee. Brasch then indorsed
them using his own name and they were cashed by, or deposited in,
a bank. In normal course they were presented to the drawee bank,
paid by it and charged to Russell's account.
.
The other class of transactions was much the same except that
Baron in these instances impersonated one Grimshaw, another responsible resident of Paterson, likewise known to Russell only by reputation. In these instaJ.?.ces Baron's supposed secretary was vVilson, equally
as fictitious as was Williams. The checks in this series, enclosed in
envelopes, were handed either by Russell or her housekeeper to a
messenger boy 2 who in turn delivered them to Baron. They then
were dealt with as were those in the first class.3
"'
When Russell learned what had happened,' her bank account had
shrunk by $22,170. In. pursuit of her understandable desire to shift
the loss to the drawee bank she started the lawsuit against it to which
reference was made above. The court concluded that the Williams
checks had been properly paid and charged to the Russell account. As
to those, Brasch was deemed to be the payee and the indorsements,
actually made by Baron in Brasch's presence, were treated as made by
the latter. As to the Wilson checks, however, the payee was taken to be
the named party-Wilson-and they had been paid by the drawee not
to Wilson and not to any indorsee of his. Those payments, therefore,
were not made in accordance with the depositor's orders and were not
properly chargeable to the Russell account.4 If Russell had known of
1

Russell v. Second Nat. Bank of Paterson, (N.J. 1947) 55 A. (2d) 21 I.
The use of the boy was prompted, of course, by the fact that Brasch could not
appear both as Williams.and Wilson.
3
One check involved in the litigation fell outside both categories. That one was
inadvertently drawn by Miss Russell to the order of Grimshaw instead of Wilson.
Otherwise it belonged, as the court observed, in the Wilson series.
4
The court, of course, had no occasion to consider what might be the possibilities
of the bank being able in turn to shift its loss, on the basis of money paid by mistake.
2
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the fiction regarding Wilson, then, of course, the checks would have
been payable to bearer and those payments would have been likewise
proper.5
.
The all-important distinction between the two classes of checks lay
in the fact that whereas the Williams checks were handed by Russell
to Brasch in the belief that he was Williams, thus enabling the court
to declare that Brasch was really the payee, the checks payable to
Wilson were delivered by Russell to a mere messenger. As to these
latter items there was no possible conflict in Russell's mind as between
Wilson and Brasch, and so far as Baron was concerned he was merely
a voice heard over a telephone. That Russell intended her money,
represented by all the checks, to go to Geller and Grimshaw through
the agency of their supposed secretaries admits of no doubt.
Few questions in the field of negotiable paper 6 are more intriguing
than that involved in the principal case-when a person for a particular
transaction assumes the name of another person and a check, for example, is drawn designating the payee therein by use of that name but
is delivered by the drawer to the human being who has assumed that
name, who really is the payee? the person named? or the person who
has assumed the name?
The court in the principal case found its guide in an earlier decision
by the same court, Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liability Ins. Co.1 often cited as a leading authority for the view opposed
to that expressed by the Rhode Island court in Tolman v. American
National Bank. 8
In the Tolman case Tolman gave a check to Potter (payable to the
order of Haskell) thinking Potter was Haskell and after making
inquiries regarding the latter. The court declared the indorsement of
Haskell's name by Potter was a forgery, hence payment by the drawee
was not properly chargeable to Tolman's account. The court said:
"It is a surprising doctrine that, if A can successfully personate B, he
thereby escapes being guilty of forgery in signing B's name on a check
of C's. Of course, C intended the money to go to him as an actual
person, but only because he supposed that he was the person whom he
represented himself to be." 9 Some language used by the New Jersey
court in the Montgomery Garage case leads one to wonder whether it
15 Though there was no Williams, Miss Russell was not aware· of that fact, hence
those checks were still order instruments, thus requiring an indorsement by the named
payee for negotiation. Such indorsement was obviously impossible.
6 A related question sometimes arises in sales of goods. See, for example, Phelps
v. McQuade, 220 N.Y. 232, n5 N.E. 441 (1917), L.R.A. 1918 B, 973.
1 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 A. 296 (1920), 22 A.L.R. 1228 (1923).
8
22 R.I. 462, 48 A. 480 (1901), 52 L.R.A. 877 (1901).
9
Id. at 463.
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would not have decided the Tolman case, on its facts, the same as did
the Rhode Island court. That language, italicized in the quotation in
the footnote, 10 indicates that when the drawer of the check has made
inquiries, as Tolman had, as to the existence and standing of the impersonated person, the instrument is then to be deemed payable to that
named person, not to the human being who impersonates him. The
decision in the principal case seems to negate any such point. Miss
Russell, though she made no inquiries regarding Geller and Grimshaw,
already knew who they were. Inquiries were therefore superfluous.
Yet the Williams checks were deemed payable not to Geller or Williams but to Brasch who appeared before her in person as Williams,
the secretary to Geller.
The imposter question may be met in a variety of situations; but no
doubt the problem arises most frequently in disputes between customerdepositor and his bank, as in the principal case. It is familiar doctrine
that banks ordinarily may properly charge ~o their depositors' accounts
only those payments made strictly in accordance with their genuine
orders. That means not only that the orders must be issued by the
depositor or his authorized agents but also that the payments be made
in the right ·amounts to the right persons. The drawer of the check is
the one to designate such person. The only really practicable way to
identify him is by the use of his name. Obviously other more certain
means of identification-such as photographs and thumb prints-are
not feasible.
Suppose, then, A wishes his bank to pay a stated sum to X known
by A to be a reliable person, but the check which he makes out payable
to X's order is actually handed to Y, who has impersonated X in the
negotiations leading to the delivery of the check. To whom may the
drawee safely pay? To whom has the drawer, A, ordered that the
money is to be paid? It is a question of intent. Clearly he was thinking
of X and thus in a subjective sense X was intended to be the recipient
of the money. But he handed the check to an actual person (really Y),
and presumably if some caller had arrived on the scene at that moment
A would have introduced the caller and Y by calling the latter X.
One enters into legal relations not with names but with human
10 "But we think that the rule is where, as here, the drawer of a check delivers
it, for a consideration which turns out to be fraudulent, to an imposter under the
belief that he is the person whose name he has assumed and to whose order the check
is made payable, a bona fide holder for a valuable consideration, paid to the imposter
upon his indorsement of the payee's name, is entitled to recover from the drawer, it
appearing that the person to whom the check was delivered was the very person whom
the drawer intended should indorse it and receive the money, and that the drawer
made no inquiry before issuing the check concerning the identity or credit of the
named payee, who was unknown to the drawer." 94 N.J.L. 152 at 154, 109 A. 296
(1920). (Italicsours.)
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beings, the names being useful only to identify the parties·. If A had
used what are generally recognized as more certain modes of identification-a photograph, or :fingerprints, for example-whose picture or
prints would have appeared on the check? At least we may be sure
that they would not have been those of X, for A thought that Y was

x.11

Suppose, then, Y goes down the street to the drawee bank and
presents A's ·check for payment. He persuades the bank, as he had
satisfied A, that he is X, and the bank pays him. Was the payment
made in accordance with A's directions? If A had had sufficient cash
in his pocket or desk so that payment might have been made in such
medium instead of by check, to whom would the cash have gone? If
one is warranted in saying that it would have gone to Y, then one has
a pretty strong reason for saying that the bank's payment to Y was
in accordance with A's genuine order.
If, when Y appeared at the teller's window at the drawee bank, the
bank's representative, perhaps doubtful as to making payment to Y, had
called A on the telephone to ask whether he had given a check to one
X and to describe him, the answers would have been first in the affirmative and then a description of Y, not X. In other words, to A the person Y was identified by the name X.12 Only a very bold person would
assert that the opposite view-that the payee truly was the party
named-is patently wrong. At the same time, the Rhode Island court
in the Tolman case surely was not warranted, in applying that opposite
view, that "it would seem that upon so plain a proposition the decisions should be unanimous; but it is not so." 18 Speaking of the two

11

In this connection one should consider Gallo v. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 199 N.Y.
222, 92 N.E. 633 (1910), 32 L.R.A. (n.s.) 66 (19n). In that case a bank refused
to pay the amount of a savings deposit to one who appeared with the passbook, the
bank being unsatisfied that such person was the owner of the deposit. The bank did,
however, draw its check on a correspondent bank in favor of its teller in the amount of
the deposit. That check was then indorsed by the teller to Cona, the depositor (according to the name as recorded) and delivered to the one who presented the pass-book.
Plaintiff took the check from the one in possession upon an identification of him as
Cona. The drawee paid the check on presentation through X Bank. In truth the
purported indorsement was a forgery, and plaintiff was compelled to refund the amount
to X Bank which in turn had been required to refund to the drawee by which the
check had been paid. Plaintiff then sued the savings bank which had issued the check.
See also District Nat. Bank v. Washington L. & T. Co., 62 App. D.C. 198, 65 F.
(2d) 831 (1933); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bi-Metallic Bank, 17 Colo. App. 229 at
230, 68 P. II5 (1902); Keel v. Wynne, 210 N.C. 426, 187 S.E. 571 (1936); II
UNiv. CIN. L. REv. 89 (1937).
12
It is interesting at this point to speculate as to how the drawee bank would
stand if Y had lost the check and it had been found by X who then, on presentment
to the drawee, received the money.
18
22 R.I. 462 at 463, 48 A. 480 (1901).
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possible intents, the one indicated by the physical being, the other by
the name, the New York Court of Appeals 14 said: ". . . Nevertheless
an examination of the cases in other jurisdictions can leave no doubt
that, as Brannan points out, in most jurisdictions it has been held that
'the first is the controlling intent' ...15 though a minority sustain the
view that the latter is controlling." 16
It would seem that in order for the controlling intent to be fixed
by the physical being not only must there have been some business
contact with him but also the contact must have been such that it may
have produced in the mind of the person whose intent is in question
a mental picture of that physical being. If the contact was wholly by
telephone, for example, the drawer of the check in our hypothetical
case could only describe a voice. In the principal case, Miss Russell had
no face to face dealings with Brasch when he was supposed to be Wilson, the supposed secretary of Grimshaw. Her conversations over the
phone were with Baron, and she delivered those checks to a messenger
boy. The New Jersey court accordingly concluded that her controlling
intent was indicated by the name she used to identify the payee. The
other checks were delivered to Brasch in person, and as to those her
controlling intent was fixed by the physical being.
In the Cohen case, the New York court concluded that while there
had been some face to face dealing between the parties, it had been
too fleeting to warrant finding an intent to pay the imposter.17 This
makes one wonder whether the statement by the same court in an
14

Cohen v. Lincoln Sav. Bank of Brooklyn, 275 N.Y. 399 at 408, IO N.E. (2d)
457 (1937), 112 A.L.R. 1424 (1938). See notes in 38 CoL. L. REv. 171 (1938);
37 MICH. L. REV. 126 (1938); 86 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 526 (1938).
15 The court here cites Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liability Ins.
Co., 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 A. 296 (1920); Land Title and Trust Co. v. Northwestern
Nat. Bank, 196 Pa. 230, 46 A. 420 (1900), 211 Pa. 211, 60 A. 723 (1905);
reference is made also to 22 A.L.R. 1228 (1923), 50 L.R.A. 75 (1901) and 52
A.L.R. 1327 (1928).
16 The court here cites the Tolman case, 22 R.I. 462, 48 A. 296 (1920).
17 In Mohr v. Lawyers Trust Co., 282 N.Y. 770, 27 N.E. (2d) 48 (1940), the
court found sufficient dealings between the drawer and the imposter to warrant a conclusion, despite the Cohen case, that the payee was the crook. See also Imperial
Motors v. Bank, (City Ct. of Queens Co. 1946) 65 N.Y.S. (2d) 86; Fidelity and
Deposit Co. v. Union Trust Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 3.
Another interesting case of impersonation, understandable on the basis of the
decision in the Cohen case, is Simpson v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 43 Utah 105, 134
P. 883 (1913), 46 L.R.A. (n.s.) II64 (1913). In that case railroad pay checks,
prepared in advance, were delivered to employees as they filed through the paymaster's
car, each man as he approached the window calling out his name. Two imposters in
the line thus obtained checks intended for, and payable to, real employees. It was held
that the payees were the persons whose names were designated in the checks, not the
imposters. It appeared that those named payees were not personally known to the
paymaster.
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earlier case 18 that "The fact that the vendor deals with the person
( the imposter) personally rather than by letter is immaterial, except
in so far as it bears upon the question of intent," means much. Of
course such difference in fact bears upon the matter of intent. But
is it not true that when the dealings are by correspondence the very
foundation for forming an intent directed by the physical being is
lacking? In such situations the imposter is merely a name, as he is
merely a voice when the dealing is by telephone.
In the principal case the dealings between Miss Russell and the
imposter Brasch ( as Williams, the secretary) were pretty fleeting, at
least as to the first check. One may wonder whether a New York court,
having the Cohen case in mind, would have found them sufficient on
which to predicate an intent to make the check payable to Brasch by the
name of Williams.10
Ralph W. Aigler*

Phelps v. McQuade, 220 N.Y. 232 at 234, n5 N.E. 441 (1917).
The essence of the imposter situation is the impersonation. It must not be
confused with instances of fictitious persons, such as that involved in Strang v. Westchester County Nat. Bank, 235 N.Y. 68, 138 N.E. 739 (1923), nor with instances of
assumed names as in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Middletown Nat. Bank,
126 Conn. 179, IO A. (2d) 604 (1939), a case in which there was not only an
assumed name but a pretense of rendition of services.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
18

19

